In this paper, we are trying to compare the labor market regulation in the Czech Republic and Austria and its structural parameters that characterize the given labor markets. In order to do that, we estimate the New-Keynesian model with matching frictions and nominal wage rigidities. Labor market regulation is proxied by worker´s bargaining power over the wage. This main parameter is moving inside the interval and express a share of the total surplus that arises from filling the vacancy. In fact it expresses the state of who gains more from the added value that the vacancy is filled (worker or employer). Results indicate that workers in Austria and the Czech Republic have almost the same bargaining power that arises from the labor market settings.
Introduction
DSGE (Dynamic stochastic general equilibrium) models are based on the New Keynesian paradigm. We use them because they can include price and wage rigidities that are characteristic for the two countries considered. These rigidities establish a link between nominal and real activity. If the nominal prices stagger, fluctuations of nominal aggregates activate the fluctuations of real aggregates. The substantial work by Gali and Gertler (1999) had shown that the dynamic behavior of inflation is closely connected to a firm's marginal costs 2 and that development of its dynamics depends on the functioning of the labor market.
In their work, Gali and Gertler (1999) assumed frictionless labor markets. According to empirical evidence from Bean (1994) and Flek and Vecernik (2005) we included labor market frictions because these works show us that labor markets in the Czech Republic and Austria are characterized by frictions that prevent competitive allocation of resources. Krause and Lubik (2007) show that these frictions enhance the idea of marginal cost in this New Keynesian model in a way that when costs of establishing a work relationship over and above the unit labor cost are included, they in principle adjust the dynamics of inflation.
The main contribution of this paper is the comparison of labor markets of the Czech Republic and Austria. We chose these two countries because they are geographic neighbors and their economies are connected. They have different levels of wages, so we want to find out if it is caused partially by the different regulation level on the labor market or just by the different level of productivity of workers. A regulation of the labor market can be caused by different sources, predominantly by flexibility of labor code, level of labor unionization and collective bargaining of wages but unfortunately, we are not able to distinguish between them and can not measure their individual influences.
We try to find out the level of regulation on the labor markets in these two countries. Our proxy parameter for this is the worker's bargaining power parameter because it can indicate who gains more from the created and filled vacancy, whether workers or employers. That can indicate if there is some space to make changes in the labor code to make acting on this market fairer for both sides.
Our understanding of this parameter is as follows. The labor market has its own characteristics according to the labor code. Somebody can think about the worker's bargaining power as an individual feature of the worker, but it is not the way we understand it. We now introduce a short example. We can imagine the same working position and the same applicant with same ability in the two countries with different labor code. 1 The process of bargaining the wage in the interview can be as follows: the applicant expresses the wage suitable for him/her and the employer gives him/her the offer, according to which the applicant decides whether to accept the job or not. Our image of this parameter is that the applicant in the country with more regulated labor code gets higher share of the total surplus that arises of filling the vacancy. This total surplus is defined by the shadow value of employment The share that household gets is expressed by this parameter, so we picture it as an objective feature of regulation at the given labor market. The second contribution is that we estimate the structural parameters of the Czech and Austrian economy.
Model
This model is a combination of the search and matching framework according to Krause et al. (2008a) with the staggered wage setting mechanism stated in Thomas (2008) . This world consists of households, firms which consist of a continuum of producers that are indexed by [0, 1] ∈ j and retailers, a monetary and fiscal authority. The following text introduces optimization problems that household and firm face, structure of the labor market, wage and hours bargaining according to Faccini, R., Millard, S. and Zanetti, F. (2010) , who created this model. At the end of this part we provide a derivation of price and wage inflation and marginal costs. Only the main parts of the model are introduced. For detailed information, please refer to the original work.
Households
Economy is populated by a continuum of identical infinitely living households on the interval [0, 1] Andolfatto (1996) .
risk aversion and µ is the inverse of the Frish elasticity of labor supply. . According to eq. (5), the Lagrange multiplier must equal the household's marginal utility of consumption. When they substitute eq. (5) into the eq. (6) and eq. (7), they get the Euler's equations that describe household's decision for consumption and capital.
1 is defined as the wage elasticity of labor supply at a constant marginal utility of wealth
3 expressed by the integral in equation (2) 4 where k δ is the rate of capital depreciation
2. Firms
In this model they suppose producers and retailers. Workers are hired by producers in a frictional labor market and the capital is rent in a perfectly competitive market. They produce homogeneous goods and sell it to retailers in a perfectly competitive market. Then the goods are transformed by retailers to the differentiated goods that are sold to the consumers. 
Producers
subject to the production function and the law of motion for employment: 
where t N and t M represent the number of workers employed and hired in period t and 0< ρ <1 is the probability that workers lose their job.
They assume, as in Blanchard and Gali (2006) , a full participation in the labor market such as: 
which shows that the E jt W is given by the real wage minus the disutility of work plus the expected-discounted value from being either employed or unemployed in the following period.
The marginal value of unemployment, U t W 1 CRS in the matching function stands for workers finding a job with probability
means that the marginal value of unemployment is the sum of unemployment benefits plus the expected-discounted value from being employed or unemployed in the period 1 + t . They can now determine the household's net value of employment at firm j , which can be calculated as 
Wage bargaining
They suppose staggered wage negotiations which means that only a part of firms 0< w δ <1 can renegotiate on wages. In accordance with Thomas (2008) , they assume that the renegotiating firm sets the wage according to the sharing rule:
where 0<η <1 is the bargaining power of the worker and the superscript means those workers and firms, who renegotiate.
2 This is the main investigating field we focus on, because it determines who obtains a bigger fraction of the total surplus equal to their bargaining power.
With staggered wage negotiations, the shadow value of employment at firm j to the household that can renegotiate, they can rewrite it from equation (21) 
This equation is standard in the search and matching literature. The target real wage bill is defined as a weighted average between the marginal revenue product of the worker and the opportunity cost of holding a job at the level of hours worked jt h . As the renegotiating firms are randomly chosen, they can write the law of motion for the aggregate wage:
Hours bargaining
Their assumption in this part is that hours and wages are bargained simultaneously and that bargaining on hours is efficient, which means that hours satisfy the Nash bargaining criterion:
By using the sharing rule, the FOC is:
On the left hand side of the equation, there is the marginal rate of substitution of hours that equals the marginal product of hours. Marginal return to the labor input is equalized across firms at equilibrium, which means that household members employed in different firms work the same amount of hours, i. e., t jt h h = . Now they solve the FOC for hours:
4. Price and wage inflation
According to Calvo (1983) , using the optimal price decision, eq. (15), and the law of motion for the aggregate price level, eq. (16), the standard New Keynesian Phillips Curve is derived: 1 where
where hat superscript means the variable's deviation from its steady-state, and the coefficient p k is equal to:
Similarly according to Thomas (2008) , using eq. (26) 
This stands for that wage inflation depending on the gap between the actual and the target real wage bill. It means that inflation can occur whenever the real wage bill is below target, that is whenever the wage bill is below the level that would prevail if wages were perfectly flexible.
5. Closing the model
The monetary authority determines the interest rate according to the Taylor The fiscal authority is assumed to run a balanced budget:
.
6. Marginal Costs
In this part it is shown a comparison of specification of marginal costs against the alternative formulations in literature. This is important for understanding of the model properties, the results and findings in the next section. According to Trigari (2006) , whenever firms post vacancies at a time t in order to acquire the employment in the following period, the matching model with efficient bargaining on hours has not got the transmission channel from wages to prices because the real marginal cost is independent of wages. The intuition behind is clear. Current hires affect next period employment, so in current period firms can change production only by adjusting hours. This indicates that the marginal cost of production depends only on hours. They have efficient bargaining over the hours worked, so the number of hours worked is determined by the marginal rate of substitution between consumption and leisure and the marginal product of labor and therefore, it is independent of wages. This implies that wages are irrelevant for marginal costs, but this channel needs to be restored.
A wage channel will be restored and simultaneously the efficient Nash bargaining will be preserved. It can be done by changing the timing assumption of the matching function. Firms are allowed to control employment at time t by choosing vacancies in the same period (described in eq. 8). Now, the cost of increasing production at the margin depends on the cost of hiring an additional worker, which is represented by the wage paid to the new hire. I can be shown by solving the job creation condition in equation (11) 
Estimation
We estimate this model with Bayesian methods. First, we log linearize it around the deterministic steady state. We use matlab toolbox Dynare 4.1.1 that solves the model and applies the Kalman filter to evaluate the likelihood function of the observable variables. We combine the likelihood function and the prior distribution of the parameters in order to obtain posterior distributions. The posterior kernel is simulated numerically using the Metropolis-Hastings algorithm. First, we discuss the data and the priors used in the estimation.
1. Priors and data
We estimate this model over the period 1998Q1-2010Q1 using five shocks and five data series gained from Eurostat. We use quarterly observations of real output scaled by the labor force. Inflation is measured as percentage changes of the GDP deflator. Average hours, employment in heads and bank rates are the next series.
1 All series, with the exception of the Bank rate, are passed through a Hodrick-Prescott filter with smoothing parameter 1600.
We used five shocks in the model and they are subsequent: preference shock, a mark-up shock, a labor supply shock, a technology shock and a monetary policy shock. All shocks, with the exception of monetary policy shock, are supposed to follow a firstorder autoregressive process with i.i.d. normal error terms such as 
The Czech Republic
We start by defining the fixed parameters. The discount factor β is set at 0.99 which implies the real interest rate of 4 %.
2 Capital depreciation k δ is set at 0.025 in order to match the average annual rate of capital destruction of 10 % and α at 0.66 to match the labor share. The habits parameter, ς , and the elasticity of the vacancy cost function, c ε are also fixed. Subsequently, the habits parameter is calibrated at 0.75 according to Hlousek (2008) and the elasticity of the vacancy cost function is set at 1.1 that is relatively close to the standard assumption of linear adjustment costs, and satisfies the assumption of convexity. Table 1 summarizes the values of the fixed parameters for the Czech Republic.
The remaining parameters are all estimated. We use Bayesian techniques for estimation so we use a prior mean, standard deviation and prior distribution information to improve the estimates. It has become a custom that we use the beta distribution for parameters that take sensible values between zero and one, the gamma distribution for coefficients restricted to be positive and the inverse gamma distribution for the shock variances. Table 2 and 3 show priors, posterior estimates and 90 % confidence intervals.
The relative risk aversion, σ , is set to 1 according Remo (2007) . The inverse Frish elasticity, µ , is set to 1.9 according the the previous work. The matching function elasticity, ξ , for the Czech economy is set to 0.42, as estimated by Burda (1993 δ is set to 0.6 according to Herber (2009) .
The elasticity of demand, ε , is set to 11. This value is shown in Britton, Larsen and Small (2000) and implies a steady state mark-up of 10 %. The main parameter, the worker bargaining power, η , is set to the standard value 0.5. Now, we choose the prior mean of the Taylor rule response to inflation, π r . Its value is 1.5, which is the standard value in the literature. The response to output 0.5 = y r is set a little bit higher than its usual value. The prior mean of the interest rate smoothing parameter is set to 0.5.
Austria
The fixed parameters are calibrated almost in the same way. The discount factor, β , is set to 0.988 in order to imply the steady state real interest rate of approximately 5 % annually. The capital depreciation rate, k δ , is set to 0.02 and the habit persistence, ς , is set to 0.5. All these fixed parameters are set according to Breuss and Rabitsch (2008) . Now we are going to introduce the prior mean calibration of estimated parameters. We concentrate on the different calibration of prior means for individual parameters. The inverse Frish elasticity, µ , is set to 2 according to Christoffel et al. (2008) . The prior mean of the matching function elasticity, ξ , is set to 0.6 according the Christo-ffel et al. (2009) . The unemployment benefits, b , is set to match a replacement ratio 0.5 as in Nickell (1997) . The prior means for the Calvo wage and price parameter are set to 0.6 according to Breuss and Rabitsch (2008) . Elasticity of demand is set classically to match the mark-up of 10 % and for that we set prior mean at 11. According to the previous work we set the priors means of the Taylor rule parameters, where these priors were used for the time period when Austria was a member of monetary union, which corresponds to our data set. The priors are y r , that is the Taylor rule response to output is set at 0.2 and π r is set at 1.7 and Taylor rule inertia is set to 0.85.
The prior settings of shock parameters are as follows. According to Breuss and Rabitsch (2008) again, we set these priors at following values. The prior means of the persistence parameters,
and a ρ are all set at 0.8and their standard errors are set as shows the Table 6 . The priors for shock parameters in Austria are set differently and higher than for the Czech Republic because according to Breuss and Rabitsch (2008) , there is the reason to think that these shocks are those mainly responsible for driving the cyclical variations in the Austrian macroeconomic time series.
Parameter estimates
The Czech Republic Table 2 shows posterior mean of the structural parameters and 90 % confidence intervals. The first parameter to comment on is the parameter of unemployment benefits that equals to 0.556, which is nearly the same as its prior.
The estimate of the inverse Frish elasticity of labor supply of 2.1586 is close to its prior, too. The estimated value of the elasticity of labor supply is therefore approximately 0.46 and can be interpreted in such a way that 1 % increase of the real wage brings only 0.46 % increase of the labor supply. The reasons for such a low value could be credited to low labor mobility, long run unemployment and an increase of labor productivity accompanying the rise in real wages, as argued in Musil and Vasicek (2006) .
The posterior for the constant of the matching function, m , is 1.0764 and the constant of the vacancy cost function, a , is 5.3820. They are almost similar to their prior means. The posterior means of ρ , the rate of job separations, is 0.0512, which is almost similar to its prior, too, and implies almost the same unemployment rate as our baseline calibration.
The posterior mean of the matching function elasticity, ξ , is equal to 0.2874, that is lower than its prior. This estimate is lower than the standard value 0.5 used in US studies, where the number of new hires depends equally on the number of unemployed people and on the vacancies posted. This low estimate suggests that the number of new hires depends more on the number of vacancies posted rather than on the number of unemployed workers.
The posterior means of the Calvo parameters that shows the frequency of wage and price adjustments and share of firms that do not optimize, w δ and p δ , are 0.7732 and 0.6021, respectively. The first value implies an average frequency of wage negotiations in this model at 4 and a half quarters 1 and shows that only 20 % of firms renegotiate their wage contracts every period.
2 The second value shows that the average frequency of price adjustment is 2 and a half quarters and almost 40 % of firms adjusts their prices every period. Now let us carry on with the posterior means in the Taylor rule. The posterior of the interest rate response to inflation, π r , is equal to 1.5234, which indicates a strong response to inflation and the degree of interest rate smoothing, r ρ , is 0.5313 and suggests a moderate degree of interest rate inertia. The high estimate for y r , equal to 1 the average duration of the wage contracts is ) (1 1 w δ − 2 every three months in this case, because we use quarterly data 0.6867, suggests a strong response to output, which is quite surprising and larger than the usual value of 0.125. mark-up shock. The persistence of the preference shock is close to unity that can suggest that in spite of the wage rigidities, the model has a weak internal mechanism of propagation and requires persistence in the shock in order to match inflation persistence.
The main parameter of our estimate is η because it represents worker's bargaining power. Our estimate is close to its prior and is equal to 0.5011, which means that the η − 1 share of the total surplus arising from filling the vacancy is gained by the worker. So it shows a very light dominance of employers in Czech Republic over the worker. Table 4 shows posterior means of the structural parameters and 90 % confidence intervals. the first parameter to comment on is the unemployment benefits that equal to 0.5015, which is nearly the same as its prior. This system is generous by U. S. standards, where this parameter is 0.5, too, but the difference is in the duration. In the U. S. it is 6 months while in Austria 2 years.
Austria
Our estimate of inverse Frish elasticity 2.2313 is quite higher than the estimates in other works. For example Breuss and Rabitsch (2008) estimated Austria's structural parameters in two periods. Pre-EMU period and EMU period correspond to our data set. Their estimate was 1.29, but their model was an adequately different two-country model. The elasticity of labor supply is then 0.448.
The posterior for the constant of the matching function, m , is 1.0219 and the constant of the vacancy cost function, a , is 4.5529. While the first one is almost similar to its prior mean, the other is quite different. The posterior means of ρ , the rate of job destruction, is 0.0464, which is a little bit higher and almost the same in the Czech Republic.
The posterior mean of the matching function elasticity, ξ , is equal to 0.4620, which is lower than its prior, but in comparison to the Czech Republic it seems that in Austria the number of new hires depends almost equally on the number of vacancies and the number of unemployed people.
The Calvo wage parameter w d is 0.6079 and implies an average frequency of wage negotiations at 2 and half quarters. The second Calvo parameter, the price Calvo para-meter, 0.5880, shows that the average frequency of price adjustment is almost the same as in the previous case. Now we will focus on the posterior means in the Taylor rule. The posterior of the interest rate response to inflation, π r , is equal to 1.6954, which indicates even stronger response to inflation than in the Czech Republic. The degree of interest rate smoothing, r ρ , is 0.8126, which is close to its prior that is standard in the literature. The high estimate for y r , equal to 0.5577, suggests a strong response to the output, but lower than in the Czech Republic. of labor supply and preference shock. The persistence of the mark-up shock is close to unity, which can suggest that in spite of the wage rigidities the model has a weak internal mechanism of propagation and in order to match inflation persistence, it requires persistence in the shock, which is the same like in the case of the Czech Republic. The shock parameters estimates do not indicate higher influence of shocks for the cyclical variations in the macroeconomic time series as it was assumed, which is in contrast of results of the work of Breuss and Rabitsch (2008) .
The main parameter,η , is close to its prior and is equal to 0.5040, which means that the η − 1 share of the total surplus, that arises from filling the vacancy gains of the worker. So it shows a very light dominance of employers in Austria over the worker. Therefore, the results regarding this parameter show that the labour market in the Czech Republic is relatively close to the Austrian one in the labor market regulation.
3. Impulse response function
This part of the work will now provide a short by-product of our analyses and show one example although it is not a main part of our article. Impulse response for the technology shock for the Czech Republic can be found in the Figure 1 . The positive technology shock increases possibilities of the economy, so it causes the growth of the potential output. Thanks to an increased productivity, the real marginal costs are decreasing, which causes inflation decrease. Lower inflation results in a lower nominal interest rate that endorses consumption and investment. In the presence of nominal wage rigidities, the real wages increases. It is perceptible that vacancies, employment and labor market tightness fall in the presence of sticky wages. Technology shock increases the marginal product of labor and the real wage. The difference between these two is the main feature that motivates firms for posting vacancies as shown in eq. (12). The real wages increase more than the marginal product of labor with sticky wages and remain boosted during the process of adjustment.
Conclusion
We estimated a New Keynesian model with labor market frictions on the data of the Czech Republic and Austria because these countries show the rigidities on labor market from the microeconomic data and from the works mentioned in the introduction. In a search and matching model like this one, the marginal cost depends on the unit labor cost and on the frictional costs of searching.
Our main goal was to estimate important structural parameters including the main one, the worker's bargaining power that represents the regulative character of the labor codes of these two economies, and to compare them to each other. Our findings were close to the prior information about the estimated structural parameters and show us the main characteristics of the labor market in these two countries.
The labor market is working quite fair according to our estimate of the worker's bargaining power. None of the negotiating sides have the decisive power to gain more from the total surplus that arise when the vacancy is fulfilled. So our analyses have proven that the different level of wages in these countries is mainly caused by the higher productivity of workers rather than by regulation of the labor market. 
